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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by §78-2a3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of

Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence?
2.

If the admission of the evidence was in violation of Rule 404(b), did the

evidence taint the jury such that their verdict would have been more favorable to the Appellant
without the testimony?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review for all issues was recently set out by this Court in State v.
O 'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993):
Thus, the procedure this Court follows when reviewing the admission of prior bad act
evidence is straight-forward. First, the evidence must, as a matter of law, be
admissible under Rule 404(b). Second, we determine, as a matter of law, whether the
trial court acted reasonably in striking the probative value versus prejudicial effect
balance required by Rule 403. If both those standards are met we will affirm. If we
determine either of the first two standards is not met, we must then determine
whether the admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error.

PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD
State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
Case No. 950324-CA

Page Number 1

Trial counsel objected to evidence of prior bad acts on the record during the trial.
Record, page 428, Line 9 - page 429, Line 2. Trial counsel again objected to further questioning.
R, p. 430, LI 14-24. The Court, after determining the evidence and that it could come in before
the jury, recognized trial counsel as having a continuing objection to the evidence. R, p. 435, LI.
4-5.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(a)
Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b)
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in an Information with Count One, Possession of a
Controlled Substance (Methamphetamine) with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony;
Count Two, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute (Marijuana), a Second
degree felony; Count Three, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor:; Count
State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
Case No. 950324-CA
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Four, Assault, a class B misdemeanor; Count Five, Unlawful Detention, a class B misdemeanor.
The charges were taken to a jury trial before the Hon. James L. Shumate. After a
one-day jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of Count One, Possession of a Controlled
Substance (Methamphetamine) with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony; Count Three,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor:; Count Four, Assault, a class B
misdemeanor; Count Five, Unlawful Detention, a class B misdemeanor. As to Count Two, the
jury convicted Appellant of the lesser included offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance
(Marijuana), a class B misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 24, 1994, the Defendant and Terri LaCorti, his girlfriend, were renting a
hotel room in St. George, and drove to a nearby Albertson's grocery store to get some aspirin.
The testimony of Terri LaCorti was that, previous to going to Albertsons, the Appellant was
"scaring me to death", and was "staring at me and saying little comments". Record, page 254,
Lines 15-17. She testified that she had observed him with drugs, both "pot" (Marijuana) and
"speed" (Methamphetamine), R, p. 255, LI. 11-16. She wanted to go to Albertsons so that she
could be around people and get awayfromhim. The two of them went into the store together. It
was Ms. LaCorti's testimony that he was holding her as they went into the store. R, p. 265, L 1 p. 266, L. 10. At one point, she "got away"fromhim and ran to a telephone. She called a friend,
who was not home, and he took the phonefromher and hung it up. R, p. 266, L. 25 - p. 267, L.
25. After hanging up the phone, he "dragged" her out of the store to the car in the parking lot,
while she was struggling and screaming, telling him to leave her alone, and that she did not want
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to go with him. R, p. 268, LI. 18-24. When at the car, she testified that Appellant shoved her
into the car and shut her door, then went around to the driver's door. She would attempt to get
out, and he would come back around and put her back in, and shut the door again. This occurred,
according to LaCorti, six or seven times. R, p. 269, LI. 8-13. She finally was able to get away,
and received assistance in calling 911. R, p. 270, LI. 15-24. When police responded, she told
them what had occurred, and the police issued a ATL ("attempt to locate") on Appellant and the
vehicle he was in. R, p. 358, LI. 1-11. Once Appellant was found, police stopped him and
searched his vehicle, and found marijuana, speed, and drug paraphernalia. R, p. 365, LI. 1-3.
While on the stand, LaCorti testified that she had used methamphetamine within 48 hours of the
incident at Albertsons. R, p. 283, LI. 8-10.
The Appellant's version of what happened was quite different. He agreed that they
went to Albertsons, R, p. 402, LI. 5-12, but disagreed that there was any struggle getting into the
store or while they were in the store. R, p. 405, LI. 4-15. Appellant testified that when they went
back out to the vehicle, LaCorti was acting strange, and he held her and asked her what was
wrong. R, p. 406, LI. 14-18. He admitted that she said she wanted to leave him, and he let her
go. R, p. 406, LI. 9-25. He affirmatively testified that he did not assault her, or put her into the
vehicle against her will. R, p. 406, LI. 9-25. He testified he had no knowledge of drugs being in
the car, but that there were items in the car belonging to other people.1 He further testified that
LaCorti had recently used methamphetamine, and that her behavior at Albertson's was consistent
with her behavior while on drugs. R, p. 419, LI. 9-20.
1

In fact, testimony from Officer Applegate was that the marijuana was found wrapped up
in a shirt belonging to LaCorti's son. R, p. 363, LI. 1-4.
State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
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To rebut his testimony that he did not assault LaCorti, the State called as a witness
Janet Brown, the Appellant's ex-wife. Brown testified as to specific incidents of physical violence
that the Appellant had displayed against her. R, p. 435, LI. 12-25. Appellant's Trial counsel
(hereinafter "trial counsel") objected to this testimony under Rule 404(b). R, p. 430, LI. 23-24.
When objected to by trial counsel, the State represented that Appellant had called his
credibility into issue, and had testified as to his "non-violent nature". R, p. 434, LI. 20-24. The
Court would not allow the testimony to come in as character testimony, but allowed it under Rule
404(b), if specific instances could be shown. The witness testified that "I was dragged by the car,
I was thrown through doors." R, p. 435, LI. 22-25. At that point, trial counsel objected again,
and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. Trial counsel objected to Brown's
testimony coming in as it did not fit as an exception under Rule 404(b). The Court agreed to a
certain extent. The Court agreed that Brown's testimony would not fit in the exceptions under
404(b) of opportunity and intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and identity, but felt that it would
come in under absence of mistake or accident. The basis for this ruling was that Ms. LaCorti was
observed with bruises on her arm immediately after the incident at Albertson's, but the Appellant
had testified that he did not know where the bruises came from on her arm, and that he did not
assault her. R, p. 432, LI. 3-13.
An examination of the entire testimony of the Appellant at trial indicates that, both on
direct examination (R, pp. 398-419) and on cross examination (R, pp. 420-426), he never
indicated that he had a "non-violent nature", or that he ever denied that he was violent. He simply
asserted that he did not assault LaCorti on that day, R, p. 416, LI. 19-21, and denied that he
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caused the bruises on LaCorti's arms. R, p. 420, LI. 10-12.
The jury found Appellant guilty as indicated above.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Brown's testimony as to prior bad acts of the Appellant at trial was ruled admissible
in violation of Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The taint to the jury was such
that it should be deemed to have been outcome determinative, and thus the Appellant was not
given a fair trial in violation of his right to due process under the Constitutions of Utah and the
United States.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

WAS BROWN'S TESTIMONY ADMITTED
IN VIOLATION OF RULE 404(b), U.R.E.?

The crux of this case was for the jury to determine who they believed: LaCorti or the
Appellant. If LaCorti was lying about what occurred Albertsons, then they jury may very well
have inferred that the drugs found also belonged to her, and were only constructively possessed
by Appellant. By bringing in the testimony of Brown as to domestic violence in their relationship,
however, the judge erred, in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
As outlined in the Standard of Review section, an analysis of whether evidence was
admitted at trial in violation of Rule 404(b) is actually a two-step process: first, was the evidence
admissible under Rule 404(b)? Second, does it pass muster under Rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence, i.e. was its prejudicial affect outweighed by its probative value?

State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
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A, WAS BROWN'S TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 404(b) AS A MATTER OF LAW?
Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring opinion to State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah
1988), spelled out the problems inherent any time prior bad acts are brought into a trial:
This Court's decisions have consistently recognized that an accused is almost
certainly prejudiced unfairly when evidence of unrelated crimes or bad acts is
introduced because of "the tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused because of
bad character rather than because he [or she] is shown to be guilty of the offenses
charged." State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. For this reason, "such evidence is
presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other
than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Id.
Bishop at 496, emphasis added.
This Court also cautioned that:
A prosecutor may not parade the details of the prior crime in front of the jury.
See Campbell [v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700] at 707. . . Care must be taken to insure the
defendant is not convicted for past rather than present crimes.
State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 at 822 (Utah App. 1990).
The Utah Supreme Court went into detail as to the admission of prior bad acts and
the logic underlying the cautions against their use at trial:
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant committed other crimes
was established, not because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends
to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process. Indeed, Dean Wigmore
has argued, "It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but
because it has too much." 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law Sec.
58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983). Thus, evidence of other crimes is generally
inadmissible unless it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and it is
introduced for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to
criminality. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 at 295 (Utah 1988).
State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
Case No. 950324-CA

Page Number 7

Under certain circumstances, evidence of prior bad acts is allowable. For instance, if
the evidence goes to prove one of the elements charged against the defendant at trial, then it will
be admissible. See State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 at 5 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d
424 at 426 (Utah 1989); and State v. Shickles, supra at 295 (Utah 1988). However, this
exception does not exist in the instant case.
Clearly, what is necessary to avoid is the bringing up of the prior bad acts in order to
show that the Defendant was acting in conformity with a criminal background. However, it is
clear that this is the sole reason that the testimony of Janet Brown (hereinafter "Brown") was
introduced as rebuttal by the State in Appellant's trial. The one of the opening questions to
Brown illustrates the State's intentions in having Brown testify:
Q:

And both — during the period of your marriage and since that time, are you have you maintained contact with Mr. Campbell? Have you known him and
his whereabouts and friends and mutual acquaintances?

A:

We have had contact several times since the divorce.

Q:

And with regard to Mr. Campbell's dealings with yourself and other women
that he has had relationships, are you familiar in any respect with those types
of relationships?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Are you aware of any reputation Mr. Campbell may have with regard to his
dealings with women that he has close personal relationships with?
MR. TERRY [Trial counsel]: Your honor, I object as to relevance. And also
I think we're getting into —
MR. ROWE [Counsel for State]: Your honor, he placed his credibility in issue
when he took the stand, and he's made representations as to his nonviolent
nature.

State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
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R, p. 428, L. 9 - p. 429, L. 2.
While the trial court ruled that this reputation testimony was inadmissible, R, p. 429,
LI. 10-11, evidence of specific instances of physical abuse was allowed in, giving as rationale rule
404(b). R, p. 429, LI. 11-13. As testimony of specific instances started coming in, via
questioning from the Court, an objection was again made by trial counsel, and the objection was
heard outside the presence of the jury. R, p. 430, LI. 14-24. Looking specifically at 404(b), trial
counsel felt that the testimony from Brown as to prior acts of physical violence by Defendant
against her did not fit under any exception, especially when dealing with a different person in a
prior relationship. R, p. 431, L. 12 - p. 432, L. 2. While the Court agreed that the testimony did
not fit under the exceptions of opportunity and intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and identity,
the Court stated:
THE COURT: But when it was pointed out on his cross-examination by Mr. Rowe
to Mr. Campbell that there were bruises shown in the photographs that were taken
immediately after the incident in Albertson's, Mr. Campbell expressed lack of
knowledge; expressed the appearance of unknown bruises on Miss LaCorti. That, to
me, requires — almost demands of the State to present evidence if it has any regarding
absence of mistake or accident.
MR. TERRY: And I think that they could do that with her or with some physician,
but not his ex-wife.
THE COURT:

I think to the contrary, counsel.

R, p. 432, LI. 5-16.
It is on this point that the trial Court erred. The information could have come in
through LaCorti, but bringing up prior bad acts with an ex-wife is not justified in testimony of
Appellant on cross-examination. And this is a classic example of how prior bad acts should not,

State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
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in this kind of case, be used against a criminal defendant: his propensity to be violent to someone
he is in a relationship with as denoted by his behavior in prior relationships. The testimony of
Brown did not go to Appellant disavowing bruises on Brown. It simply showed that he had been
violent with another person in a previous relationship, and that his actions with LaCorti was more
likely in conformity with that kind of criminal behavior. Echoing the holding of the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985), evidence of other crimes is generally
inadmissible unless it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and it is introduced
for a purpose other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality. It is clear that the
Brown testimony was introduced simply to show that the Appellant acted in conformity with a
criminal predisposition.
B. WAS BROWN'S TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 403 AS A MATTER OF LAW?
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the delicate balancing act that occurs in a
question of the admission of evidence in light of rule 404(b) as follows:
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular element of a crime
and is not offered merely to show criminal predisposition, such evidence is not
automatically admissible under Rule 404(b). 10 J. Moore & J. Bendix, Moore's
Federal Practice, Sec. 404.21[2](2d ed. 1988). It's tendency to lead the finder of
fact to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced against its probative value
and the need for such evidence in proving a particular issue. E. Cleary, McCormick
on Evidence, Sec. 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984) suggests the factors to be evaluated in
the balancing process:
The problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but of classifying and
then balancing. In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of matters
need to be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the
efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably
State v. Jejfery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
Case No. 950324-CA
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will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
State v. Shickles, supra at 295-296 (Utah 1988).
Determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, in itself requires a two
part test. At the first stage, the party attempting to show that admitted evidence is in violation of
Rule 403 has the burden of showing whether the proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to
unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury. If it is determined that the proffered evidence has
.the unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead, then—in the second stage—the
proponent of the evidence has the burden to establish that the proffered evidence has unique
probative value, in spite of its tendency to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead. At the first
stage, the presumption is in favor of admissibility of evidence; at the second stage, the
presumption reverses, and it is presumed the evidence should be excluded under Rule 403. See
State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah App. 1995), State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 12211222 (Utah 1993), State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989), and State v. Lafferty, 749
P.2d 1239, at 1256 (Utah 1988).
Evidence will be considered unfairly prejudicial or inflammatory, if it has a tendency
to "influence the outcome of the trial by improper means, or if it appeals to the jury's sympathies,
or arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes a jury to base its
decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." Olympus Hills
Shopping Center, Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 889 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah App.
1994).
Evidence having an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead, is

State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
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"evidence which is uniquely subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and
improperly skew the outcome." State v. Lqfferty, supra at 1256. The danger of such evidence is
that the jury is likely to misuse it—use it for an improper purpose, rather than the proper purpose
for which it was ostensibly offered.
As Justice Zimmerman pointed out in Bishop, supra at 496, evidence of prior bad acts
is nearly by definition unfairly prejudicial, because of the propensity of jurors to convict based on
the prior crimes evidence, rather than on evidence of the instant crime. And the instant case is
not, again, a case where the testimony of the prior bad acts is an element of the crimes he was
charged with, but rather unrelated by time, circumstance and person to the victim in his trial.
Clearly, prior bad acts are unfairly prejudicial—but was there a unique probative value
favoring admission? As the Utah Supreme Court made clear in State v. Dunn, supra at 12211222 (Utah 1993), the second step of this analysis presumes inadmissibility of the evidence. The
only reason proffered by the Court for the admission of Brown's testimony was that bruises on
LaCorti's arm had no explanation by the Appellant while on the stand, and that he had testified
that he had not assaulted her. NOT that he had never assaulted her. NOT that he had never
assaulted anyone. Just that he did not assault her on that day, and that he did not know where the
bruises came from. The rebuttal of this testimony does not require testimony as prejudicial as
Brown's was. There was not any kind of unique probative value to the testimony as it related to
the bruises. On both steps, the Brown testimony fails the test for Rule 403.
In summary, a question of whether or not testimony is admitted in violation of Rule
404(b) is in fact a two-fold test: first, is it a violation of Rule 404(b)? Second, is it a violation of
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Rule 403? And the determination of whether Rule 403 is violated is in itself a two-part test: first,
did the testimony have the character of being unfairly prejudicial? Second, was there a unique and
overriding probative value to the testimony? On every step of this analysis, the testimony of
Brown fails to pass muster. It was error for the Court to admit the evidence, and it prejudiced the
Appellant unfairly in his trial.
POINT H.

WOULD THE JURY'S VERDICT HAVE BEEN MORE
FAVORABLE TO APPELLANT HAD THE BROWN
TESTIMONY NOT BEEN ADMITTED?

Finally, even if the testimony of Brown was improperly admitted, and if it was in fact
a violation of Rules 404(b) and 403, was the admission of that evidence outcome-determinative?
Or was the error harmless? An error is harmless, according to the Utah Supreme Court, if, absent
the error, there is no substantial likelihood of a better result for the defendant. State v. Johnson,
784 P.2d 1135, 1140 (Utah 1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-122 (Utah 1989). As noted
in State v. O 'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 (Utah App. 1993),
Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction only where we
conclude there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings." [quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)]
In State v. Barker, 191 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1990), this Court ruled that testimony
from an arresting officer was excludable hearsay. In assessing whether the error was harmless,
this Court looked to the facts of the case. In Barker, the facts were contested between the State's
witnesses and the defense. In resolving a factual conflict, this Court felt, the inadmissible hearsay
(which favored the State's case) would very well have been critical in the jury's determinations.
Id, 797 P.2d at 455. In the instant case, as noted above, the Appellant and LaCorti had quite
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differing stories as to what occurred on October 25, 1994. Had Appellant in fact assaulted
LaCorti? Had he unlawfully detained her? And the answer to these also would go to the
Appellant's believability as to whether or not the drugs found in the vehicle he was in were his or
not. There was evidence that his story was true. The marijuana was wrapped up in LaCorti's
son's shirt. There was evidence from customers or employees at Albertson's to support LaCorti's
contention that she struggled with Appellant, but only to the struggle by the car after exiting from
the store, not to any struggle inside the store. In fact, her testimony was that she had used a
phone at the courtesy counter, and that he hung it up and dragged her outside. There was no
testimony from Albertson's employees as to anything like this happening. The crux of the case
was an issue of believability: who was telling the truth? Unfortunately, the testimony of Brown
tended only to show that if, in fact, Appellant caused the bruises on LaCorti's arms, that he did so
in conformity with prior criminal conduct. This certainly tainted the jury against Appellant, and it
is quite certain that the outcome would have been more favorable to the Appellant without the
testimony. In State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), the Defendant took the stand, and
admitted to a prior conviction of burglary. The prosecutor, in his closing argument, argued that
the Defendant simply had a criminal mind, as evidenced in his prior conviction, and that therefore
he was guilty of the charged crime. Id at 1372. The Utah Supreme Court noted that the
argumentation was an improper use of a prior bad act, as it called the jury's attention to the
Defendant's criminal propensity.
Under Rule 404, this was an improper use of a bad act and prior conviction
and allowed jurors to consider matters they were not justified n considering in
reaching their verdict.

State v. Jeffery Lynn Campbell - Brief of Appellant
Case No. 950324-CA

Page Number 14

Id at 1372.
The Court then concluded:
The substantive use of defendant's prior bad acts . . . added greatly to the
likelihood that the jury inferred guilty knowledgefromthe character of the defendant.
Id at 1373.
While the State in the instant case did not argue the prior bad acts to the jury during
closing, the evidence was still improperly given to the jury for consideration, based solely upon
the need of the State to show that the Appellant was acting with a criminal predisposition.
Clearly, the test for there being a substantial likelihood of a better result for the Appellant has
been met, and the conviction should be reversed.
POINT HI: WAS THERE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
Counsel for Appellant has made a conscientious examination of the record and has
researched the law and cannot, in good faith, present an argument to the issue of whether or not
there was ineffective assistance of trial counsel which would not be frivolous. Therefore,
appellate counsel must reluctantly submit this point pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 18 L.Ed. 2d 493, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 1968 (Utah 1981).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests that this Courtfindthat it was
prejudicial error for the Court to allow the jury to hear testimony regarding prior bad acts from
Brown, and that the conviction be reversed.
ADDENDUM
There is no need for an Addendum attachment to this brief.
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